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Abstract
In this work it will be addressed the issue of singularities in space-time as described by Einstein's
theory  of  gravitation  in  connection  to  issues  related  to  cosmology;  more  specifically  we  will
consider the singular FLRW space-time of contemporary cosmology in relation to the issue of the
beginning of time in the so-called big bang.
1. Introduction
John Earman (1995) called the attention to singularities as an important foundational issue in space-
time philosophy. While there are some high quality works devoted to this  subject it  is still  not
widely considered  (see,  e.g.  Lam 2007,  Curiel  2009,  Manchak 2014).  Part  of  the  difficulty  in
dealing with singular space-times might be the lack of a general definition of what is a singularity.
There is no unique definition. According to Earman the semiofficial definition of a singular space-
time is made in terms of the so-called b-incompleteness (Earman 1995, 36). A curve  γ(t) in the
manifold can be parametrized in terms of a so-called generalized affine parameter  θ(t). If  θ(t) is
bounded  then  we  call  it  b-incomplete  and  the  space-time  is  considered  singular.  The  b-
incompleteness  improves  in  relation  to  a  tentative  general  all-encompassing  definition  of
singularities in terms of geodesic incompleteness (Curiel 2009, 7).1 However as Curiel mentions:
the most damning fact about b-completeness is that, so far as I know, it is never used in the
statement or demonstration of any result of physical interest. All the singularity theorems,
for  instance,  demonstrate  only  the  existence  of  null  or  timelike  geodesics,  and  are
formulated only in those terms. (Curiel 2009, 8)
For the purpose of this work it is enough to frame the singular space-time in terms of Earman's
second and fourth 'tries' for tentative definitions (Earman 1995, 29-31): the blowup of curvature
scalars  (that  Earman  refers  to  as  sufficient  criterion,  but  not  a  necessary  one)2,  and  the
incompleteness, in our case, of timelike geodesics.
As it is well-known, the contemporary general relativistic model of space-time in cosmology is
based on the Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) metrics and the Friedmann-Lemaître
equations obtained from Einstein's equations with the FLRW line element and a stress-energy tensor
treating matter as a perfect fluid (more exactly, in Friedmann's approach, as dust). This space-time
is singular (see, e.g., Wald 1984 91-116; Rindler 2006, 347-416; Narlikar 2010, 245-273). In this
way  singularities  are  an  aspect  of  our  contemporary  description  of  the  Universe's  evolution.
Importantly  the  FLRW singularity  is  not  due  to  the  symmetries  of  the  model  (due  to  spatial
homogeneity and isotropy); it is a generic feature of cosmological space-time models (including
1 An inextensible geodesic is incomplete when the range of its affine parameter is not the whole real line (see, e.g.,
Ludvigsen 1999, 156).
2 Curiel  (2009, 8-14) calls the attention to subtleties related to the blowup of curvature scalars (or the Riemann
tensor) that led him to consider that “curvature pathology, as standardly quantified, is not in any physical sense a
well defined property of a region of spacetime simpliciter” (Curiel 2009, 13). However in the case being considered
in this work, that of Friedmann models, it is generally accepted that the density blowup (and corresponding blowup
of the Ricci tensor) signal a singularity (see, e.g. Wald 1984, 99; Curiel 2009, 14 footnote 37)
less symmetrical models), as it is shown by the so-called singularity theorems (see, e.g., Wald 1984,
211-241; Earman 1995, 50-56).
In this work we will address the question of the beginning of time in the context of assuming a
Friedmann model  for  space-time,  i.e.  a  singular  space-time,  which corresponds in  the standard
cosmological model to the so-called big bang (see, e.g., Narlikar 2010, 223-331). This work will be
developed around views and questions set forward by Henrik Zinkernagel and Erik Curiel.
    On a paper on the concept of time in modern cosmology Svend Rugh and Henrik Zinkernagel
address the issue of having or not a well defined concept of (cosmic) time in the early stages of the
Universe (Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009). In a related work Zinkernagel addresses the question of the
'beginning of time' in a cosmological context (Zinkernagel 2008). According to Zinkernagel, “if the
big bang model is a (roughly) correct description of our universe, then the best current answer to the
question [did time have a beginning?] is that time did have a beginning” (Zinkernagel 2008, 237).
    There is in our view an important insight in Curiel's work on singularities that provides a starting
point to address, more thoroughly, the question and answer provided in Zinkernagel (2008) from the
perspective of the study of space-time singularities. According to Curiel 
questions about what happened “before” the Big Bang, or why the universe “came into
being”, can come from their former nebulosity into sharper definition, for they become
questions about the presence of certain  global structure in the spacetime manifold, [(the
singular structure)]. (Curiel 2009, 142)
From this perspective, the singular space-time itself would be our tool to provide an 'explanation',
from within Einstein's theory of gravitation, of the 'beginning of time'. A criticism to Curiel’s views
might be, as he mentions, the apparent lack of 'explanation' involved in the reference to the singular
structure. For example, 
since  a  [incomplete]  timelike  geodesic  is  the  possible  worldline  of  an  observer  or  a
particle, it is prima facie possible that an observer or particle could traverse such a singular
curve, which seems to imply that a particle could pop in or out of existence ex nihilo or ad
nihilum with no known physical process or mechanism capable of effecting such a thing
dynamically (Curiel 2009b, 56).
In this work we will make the case that the singular structure of the FLRW model does in fact
provided a sharper definition/characterization, in this case, of the issue of the beginning of time; and
that  the  difficulty mentioned by Curiel  when making reference  to  the  space-time singularity is
'dissolved' when clarifying the content and implications of having a singular FLRW space-time.
2. On Curiel's proposition for considering questions like “did time have a beginning?” as questions
about the presence of a global structure in space-time – the singular structure
Curiel  distinguishes  between what  he calls  local  and global  properties/structures  of space-time.
Accordingly, in an analogous way to topological properties, a local property must hold in arbitrarily
small neighborhoods of every point of a manifold. If a property is not local then it is global (Curiel
2009,  22).  Maximally  incomplete  time-like  geodesics  are  according  to  Curiel  a  global
property/structure of space-time (Curiel 2009, 22-3; Curiel 2009b 55-58). In this way
the incompleteness of the singular curve, however, as a property of the curve, does not exist in any
localized  sense  in  space-time.  In  general,  one  cannot  even  associate  the  incompleteness  of  an
incomplete,  inextendible  curve with a  bounded region of space-time.  The existence of  such an
incomplete curve is, in a technical sense, a global feature of the space-time manifold and its metric.
(Curiel 2009b, 58)
Characterizing the singular feature of a space-time in terms of incomplete curves leads to a view not
of a singularity in space-time (a phrase that seems to indicate a local structure)  but of singular
space-times, i.e. space-times which have a global property/structure which we may call singularity
while having in mind that this is not a local feature. 
Curiel regards the (global) singular structure as a 'topological-like' global structure:
the  non-localizability of  incomplete,  inextendible  curves  is  no different  from that  of  any other
global topological structure, such as the spacetime manifold's paracompactness or the fact that it is
Hausdorff separable or the value of its Euler characteristic. (Curiel 2009d, 58)
Curiel then thinks that the singular structure “would simply be one more type of global structure
that  all  space-times  necessarily  had,  along  with,  e.g.,  paracompactness”  (Curiel  2009,  26).  By
adopting this view in terms of a topological-like global structure, Curiel considers that it is at this
'level' that we can address several issues. In this way
questions about what happened “before” the Big Bang, or why the universe “came into being”, can
come from their former nebulosity into sharper definition,  for they become questions about the
presence  of  certain  global  structure  in  the  space-time  manifold,  in  principle  no  different  from
paracompactness,  connectedness  or  the  existence  of  an affine  connection,  and one  can  at  least
envisage  possible  forms  of  an  answer  to  the  (precise)  question,  “Are  there  any  factors  that
necessitate space-time’s having such and such global structure?” And were we actually to observe
particles  popping in  and  out  of  existence,  we could  formulate  and  begin  trying  to  answer  the
analogous questions. (Curiel 2009, 27-8)
Regarding the eventual phenomena of particles popping in and out of existence they seem to be a
possibility when having a singular space-time, since curve incompleteness
seems to imply that particles could be “annihilated” or “created” right in the middle of space-time,
with  no  known  physical  force  or  mechanism  capable  of  performing  such  a  virtuosic  feat  of
prestidigitation (Curiel 2009, 26)
As already mentioned, Curiel recognizes that the approach in terms of the global structure might
lead to problems in 'explaining' this type of phenomena. According to Curiel
a viewpoint [in terms of the singular structure] would seem to deny that certain types of potentially
observable physical phenomena require explanation, when on their face they would look puzzling,
to say the least. Were we to witness particles popping in and out of existence, the mettle of physics
surely would demand an explanation. I would contend in such a case, however, that a perfectly
adequate explanation was at hand: we would be observing singular structure (Curiel 2009, 27)
Without going into the details of what we might consider to be an 'explanation', simply referring to
the singular structure does not provide much regarding,.e.g, the particular hypothetical phenomena
of particles popping in and out of space-time. Curiel writes that if we observed this phenomena,
somehow we might formulate it in terms of the singular structure (Curiel is not explicit how), and
“begin trying to answer” (Curiel 2009, 28) whatever questions we might consider as related to it.
Curiel envisages an approach in which issues might be address not, e.g., at a 'level' in which we
make reference to the incomplete time-like geodesics, but at a more 'general' or 'abstract' level of a
global structure “no different from that  of any other global topological structure” (Curiel 2009d,
58). However Curiel arrives at a characterization of singularities as a global feature of space-time
by considering incomplete time-like geodesics; and also, eventual explanatory difficulties arising by
making  reference  to  the  global  structure  arise  exactly  by  taking  into  account  some  of  the
phenomena that might be related to the incomplete time-like geodesics.  In this way the existence of
incomplete time-like geodesics is what makes 'singularities' into a global structure and eventually
makes problematic any explanation made by reference to the global structure. 
In this work we will be faithful to the spirit of Curiel's proposition but not to the letter. Instead of
trying to develop an approach in terms of a mathematical 'topological-like' global structure of a
manifold we will take the, for some, 'old-fashion' approach of considering directly the incomplete
time-like geodesics in the context of a specific model that is a solution of Einstein's field equations.
We think we are still being faithful to Curiel's predicate since it will be a detailed analysis of the
physics of incomplete time-like geodesics (i.e. part of the physics of the singular structure) that will
enable us to bring into a 'sharp definition' the question “did time have a beginning?” and address it
more thoroughly.
3. The curvature blowup and geodesic incompleteness of the singular space-time of the Friedmann
model 
Let us consider the case of a Friedmann model in which we take galaxies to be represented by 'dust'.
The stress-energy tensor of matter in the present epoch is given by the simple expression Tab =
ρauaub, where we can take ρ to be the observed average density of matter (see, e.g., Geroch 1972,
53-57).  This simple matter distribution has the immediate implication that the universe cannot be
static: the second derivative of the so-called scale factor a(τ) of the FLRW metric (or Friedmann
equations) is negative, implying that the first derivative is positive or negative but not zero (see,
e.g., Wald 1984, 96-98). We can interpret a(τ) physically as the rate of expansion of the Universe
(see, e.g., Geroch 1972, 47-9). If da(τ)/dτ > 0 the Universe is expanding; in fact observation led us
to think that the universe is in this epoch with an accelerated expansion (see, e.g., Schmidt 2012).
From the matter conservation equation it follows that when t → 0+ the scale factor a(τ) goes to
zero and the density ρ goes to infinity (see, e.g., Ludvigsen 1999, 179). This is not a singularity in
the matter field but a singularity in the space-time itself. That is, there is no t = 0 point of the space-
time manifold. This can already be seen from the fact that the scalar curvature of space goes to
infinity as ρ goes to infinity due to the relation between the Ricci tensor and the density (see, e.g.,
Geroch 1972, 51).  
We can further check on the singular nature of space-time by considering the timelike geodesic
equations (see, e.g., Fernández-Jambrina and Lazkov 2006). Expanding the scale factor as a series
expansion around the (physically inexistent) time value of t = 0 conventionally taken to be the 'time'
at the (mathematical) singularity, and retaining only the lowest order term we have a(t) = c0(t)tη0,
where c0 > 0 and, due to the fact that we are considering an expanding universe, η0 > 0 (see, e.g.,
Cattoën and Visser 2005;  Fernández-Jambrina and Lazkov 2006). In this case while we obtain a
finite proper time when integrating the equation for time from t0 = 0 to the present epoch, the
geodesic is singular at t0 = 0 since dt/dτ is infinite there. We have an incomplete geodesic and a
singularity  at  t  =  0  (Fernández-Jambrina  and  Lazkov  2006).  It  is  important  to  notice  that
mathematically t = 0 is not a 'point' of the manifold (as we immediately see from the singular nature
of the geodesic). When we are determining the integral for the time between 0 and the time at the
present epoch, we are in fact calculating an improper integral in which t = 0 is not part of the
domain of integration.3 
4. Obtaining the Friedmann solutions and the 'place' of the singularity in them
Modern  cosmology is  a  combination  of  several  physical  theories  with  a  particular  tradition  of
observation, and related input from experimentation related to pertinent theories. The hot big bang
model is not simply a model of general relativity but of general relativity plus a plethora of other
3 On the mathematical notion of improper integral see, e.g., Mattuck (1999, 290-9), Ross (2013, 331-6).
theories (see, e.g., Narlikar 2010, 275-304; Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009; Zinkernagel 2002). Part of
the  observational  evidence  for  the  hot  big  bang  (in  particular  the  prediction  of  light  element
abundances from nucleosynthesis and the cosmic microwave background radiation) are not related
to general relativistic models of space-time. The main observation related to these models is the
Hubble expansion.
If we look just into Einstein's theory of gravitation we do not have any 'initial' explosion. As
Wald called the attention to “the big bang does not represent an explosion of matter concentrated at
a point of a preexisting, nonsingular spacetime” (Wald 1984, 99). To see this clearly let us look,
e.g.,  into  Geroch's  presentation  of  the  Friedmann  models  (Geroch  1972).  As  mentioned  the
Friedmann equations are obtained by solving Einstein's equations by taking into account (explicitly
or implicitly) the Robertson-Walker line element corresponding to a homogeneous and isotropic
universe and a stress-energy tensor of matter  corresponding to  the simplifying assumption of a
distribution of dust with a uniform density ρ. From this Geroch obtains two equations. According to
Geroch the first equation 
has a simple physical interpretation. The da/dt is “the rate of charge with time of the rate of
expansion of the Universe” and [the second equation] is also clear physically. It states that
“the mass density of the dust decreases at a rate proportional to the rate of expansion of the
Universe" – exactly what we would expect from conservation of dust particles. (Geroch
1972, 48)
The 'spatial geometry' of the Friedmann model can be characterized by the Ricci tensor R ac = hac
[4piGρ – da/dt – 3a2]. According to Geroch
The fundamental quantities in the Friedmann solutions are a (the expansion rate),  ρ (the
mass  density  of  galaxies),  and  R  (Rmm,  the  scalar  curvature  of  space).  These  three
quantities are not independent of each other, but satisfy a single identity; R = 16piGρ  – ra2
… Thus, we may regard a and ρ as the independent quantities, with R expressed in terms
of these by [the previous expression]. If, at any point of space-time, the values of a and ρ
are given, then the values of a and ρ for all t are thereby determined by [the Friedmann
equations]. Thus, these two quantities would have to be measured at the present Epoch of
our Universe to determine in which Friedmann solution we live, and in what portion of that
solution we are. (Geroch 1972, 51)
As we can see from this procedure to set up the model, we do not start with some sort of 'pre-
manifold' with an asymptotically(?) high density from which dynamically emerges the space-time
manifold  of  the  Friedmann  model.  The  parameters  of  the  model  are  fixed  by  present  time
observations and one retrogrades backwards in time using the Friedmann equations arriving at an
infinite density (see, e.g., Fernández-Jambrina and Lazkov 2010); or the geodesic equation (see,
e.g., Fernández-Jambrina and Lazkov 2006) – corresponding to the Friedmann model –, arriving at
a finite time but a singularity in the geodesic (implying both that we have an incomplete geodesic). 
Importantly one does not reach the mathematical singularity: there is no 'initial' moment! It is
correct that the proper time of an 'observer' going contrafactually backwards in time approaching
the singularity is finite. However, as we have seen, we are dealing with an improper integral: t = 0 is
not part of the domain of integration. We might say that as the observer approaches asymptotically
the singularity the measured/calculated proper time converges to a finite value; but this convergence
does not imply that the observer reaches the singularity. The singularity (thought as a mathematical
point, not in the sense of the singular structure) is not part of space-time; it cannot be reached. In
this way, there is no  initial big bang in the FLRW cosmological models of the theory of general
relativity, what we have is a 'singularity' in the past when retrograding in time the models.
5. Implications of the singular structure
Since we have a finite proper time associated to the incomplete timelike geodesics 'falling' into the
singularity as we move backwards on time, the answer to the question “did time have a beginning?”
seems to be yes; However from the previously seen in this paper, that does not seem to be the best
way to answer the question. As Curiel expected, the reference to the singular structure of the space-
time does enable a sharper definition/characterization of the issue at stake. 
The singular space-time implies that the geodesics of possible observers going contrafactually
backwards in time are incomplete and their proper times determined by improper integrals converge
to finite values.  As we have seen,  we have no starting moment at  the 'singularity';  our starting
moment is the present time where we set the parameters of the model. The retrogression of the
model does not reach the 'starting point' at the big bang. Under this conditions the use of the word
'beginning' to characterize the situation seems misleading. It might be more appropriate to say that
the model implies that time is bounded, i.e. that we cannot consider that the model predicts that
time can be meaningfully extended backwards into the past to infinity:
singular Friedmann space-time → bounded cosmic time.  
Under these circumstances the received view (see,  e.g.,  Hawking and Ellis  1973, 258) that  the
singular space-time makes it possible for matter to pop out or into existence without any 'dynamical'
explanation  does  not  apply.  The  general  relativistic  model  does  not  bear  on  the  issue  of  the
'beginning'  of  the  universe  or  time  or  “what  existed  before  the  big  bang?”  and  other  similar
questions. There is no beginning in the Friedmann space-time due to its singular structure. The most
we can do is to analyze the behavior of matter in incomplete worldlines 'moving' contrafactually
backwards in time. The model does predicts that an observer will measure a (converging) finite
proper time in her/his backward motion along an incomplete geodesic – a geodesic without a final
'initial'-point; however the observer never 'falls' out of the Universe (the space-time manifold). In
Einstein's theory of gravitation we have a description of the 'evolution' of the space-time manifold
'intertwined' with matter/electromagnetic fields. Nothing comes or goes out/in of existence.
6. As we go backwards in time towards the singularity
To address a question like “did time have a beginning?” it might be relevant to consider the domain
of  applicability  of  general  relativity  in  the  context  of  the  backward  retrograding  towards  the
mathematical singularity. Basically what we want to know is if there are reasons to consider that the
mathematical  singularity is  somewhat  outside the domain of applicability of the theory from a
physical point of view, i.e. if as we go backwards in time we reach a 'region' where we cannot
consider the theory to be meaningfully applicable. We will consider three ways of addressing the
issue:
a) breakdown of general relativity as we approach a time where quantum aspects must be taken into
account.
b) limitation of the applicability of the theory when taking into account the input of other theories
relevant in contemporary cosmology and the big bang model.
c) limitations of applicability due to the theory itself.
First approach: it is speculated that around the so-called Planck time tp = sqrt(hG/2pic5) quantum
effects must be taken into account and the classical general relativity cannot be applied 'below' the
plank time. It is important to notice that as Rickles (2008) mentions quantum gravity is a 'work in
progress'; there is no existing quantum theory of gravity (QTG). The Planck time is 'obtained' by
dimensional analysis. It is the only constant obtained from a combination of G, c, and h so that [tp]
= s. It is not even clear if a 'full' quantum theory of gravity (QTG) will avoid the singularity. As
Wüthrich considers: 
So do quantum effects generically wash out the initial singularity? There exists a plethora of
further examples and counterexamples in the literature. This wealth of possibilities makes it
impossible  to  draw any general  conclusion.  While  some of  the results  discussed  in  this
section can be taken as indication that quantum effects may generically smooth out classical
singularities, at the bare minimum they induce the hope that a full QTG will be free of the
singularities that so persistently plague the classical theory of general relativity. (Wüthrich
2006, 113)
Due to this state of affairs in QTG or other speculative high energy physical theories we will not
consider this option to impose a limitation in the domain of applicability of general relativity that
would exclude somehow the space-time singularity of the Friedmann model. 
Second approach: according to Rugh and Zingernagel (2009) the interpretation of the manifold
parameter  as  a  physical  time  needs  the  existence  of  physical  processes  in  space-time  that  can
function  as,  what  they  call,  core  clocks.  The  authors'  analysis  of  physical  processes  that  are
supposed to occur in the different epochs of the big bang model leads them to suggests that 
the  necessary physical  requirements  for  setting  up a  comoving coordinate  system (the
reference frame) for the FLRW model, and for making the t ←→ time interpretation, are
no longer satisfied above the electroweak phase transition – unless speculative new physics
is invoked. (Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009, 40)
One way of reading this suggestion is to say that around the time 10 -11 of the electroweak transition
we reach the limit of applicability of the theory. After all below 10-11 the mathematical time of the
FLRW models would not be a physical time.4 Nevertheless regarding the question “did time have a
beginning?” in the context of the big bang model, Zinkernagel, while considering that “there are
thus good reasons to doubt that the t ←→ time interpretation can be made all the way back to t = 0”
(Zinkernagel 2008, 16), still affirms that “if the big bang model is a roughly correct description of
our universe at large scales – the current best answer we have to the question of whether time had a
beginning  is  affirmative”  (Zinkernagel  2008,  19).  It  seems  difficult  to  make  compatible  this
conclusion with the view that 'below' 10-11 seconds we do not have a well defined conception of
time. At least it seems necessary to make more precise what 'beginning' might mean in this context. 
For the purpose of this work we just want to call the attention to the fact that these views are
made by considering the cosmological model as a whole including different physical theories like
the  electroweak  theory,  quantum  chromodynamics,  nuclear  physics,  statistical  mechanics,  and
others. The purpose of this work is to address the issue solely from general relativity. In this way we
will not consider (eventual) 'external' limitations to the domain of applicability of general relativity.
4 Another related reading of  Rugh and Zingernagel (2009) might be that it shows the inconsistency (at least at a
conceptual level) of the 'package' of theories of cosmology below the time 10-11. Due to the electroweak (Higgs)
transition, at times earlier than  ∼ 10-11 seconds we cannot make the t ←→ time interpretation anymore. This can be
read as implying that the time concept becomes 'insufficiently founded'; this then implies that quantum fields do not
have  a  space-time 'background structure'  necessary for  their  definition and  application,  i.e.  there  is  a  'logical'
breakdown in arguments using cosmology as a whole below  10-11:  we are considering a quantum field theory
applicable below 10-11 to conclude that general relativity cannot be applied and thus that the quantum field theories
we started with could not have been applied. This seems to imply that the 'package' of theories of cosmology is
inconsistent for times below 10-11.
Third approach: according to Brown (2005) we need the so-called clock hypothesis5 to identify the
parameter along a timelike worldline with proper time as the time gone by the material system in
the worldline. We could expect that 'near' the singularity there could be no classical mechanical
systems that could still behave as a clock. In this way we would loose any physical meaning of the
parameter in terms of a time. We will not consider this possibility in this work on account of two
things. One: even in a flat part of space-time we can imagine, e.g., a strong electromagnetic field
that disturbs any mechanical physical system preventing it from functioning as a clock. If this is the
case and we consider there to be a problem in identifying the proper time parameter as a time this
would be an important foundational problem that goes well beyond the issue of singularities. It
seems difficult  to accept the view that we need a model of a mechanical clock to maintain an
interpretation of proper time parameter as a time. In this case, an accelerated (classical) material
particle might not have any time ascribed to it, only, possibly(?), indirectly through the coordinate
time. While there is no prove to the contrary we will consider general relativity as innocent of such
a drastic problem.6 Second: there are alternatives to Brown's views. For example Arthur (2010)
considers that the invariant Minkowski proper time is a physical magnitude implicitly defining an
ideal clock. The clock hypothesis  would be only a  criterion to check when we might expect a
particular physical system to behave (or not) as an ideal clock. In this view we can maintain an
interpretation  of  proper  time  as  a  time  all  along  a  timelike  worldline,  independently  that  the
worldline is complete or incomplete. This is the view adopted in this work.
7. Conclusions
In this  paper  we have tried to  give an example where we apply Curiel's  insight  that  there are
questions related to the big bang model that “can come from their former nebulosity into sharper
definition, for they become questions about the presence of certain global structure in the spacetime
manifold, [(the singular structure)]” (Curiel 2009, 142). 
The issue of “did time have a beginning?” is addressed by explicitly taking into account the
singular structure of the space-time. We think this approach improves on Zinkernagel's, not only by
answering the question by relying just on general relativity,7 but, more importantly, by bringing into
a sharper definition the physical situation that we have with Friedmann's singular space-time:
5 According to Brown, the clock hypothesis is “the claim that when a clock is accelerated, the effect of motion on the
rate of the clock is no more than that associated with its instantaneous velocity – the acceleration adds nothing”
(Brown 2005, 9). In Brown's view this is the case when “the external forces accelerating the clock are small in
relation to the internal 'restoring' forces at work inside the clock” (Brown 2005, 115).
6 It might be possible to re-frame the issue of the clock hypothesis, specifically the breakdown of the identification of
Minkowski's proper time parameter with a physical time, in terms of Rugh and Zinkernagel's time-clock relation
and the consequences of its breakdown (Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009, 5). This might enable to consider this eventual
foundational issue from the perspective of Rugh and Zinkernagel's approach. We will not address this possibility
here.
7 From a methodological point of view we think it is a better option to consider the issue of the beginning of time
first from general relativity and only after from cosmology, which is not done in Zinkernagel (2008). In the context
of general relativity we arrive at a view of a bounded time: we cannot contrafactually go indefinitely into the past
but there is no meaningful notion of t = 0 even if the proper time of a backwardly moving observer is finite. In this
way the use of the term 'beginning' might be misleading or even inapplicable in this context. If we now take into
account Rugh and Zingernagel (2009) 'result' that around the time 10 -11 we might not have any meaningful concept
of time (which we might interpret as having reached the 'limit' of the domain of applicability of general relativity in
the context of cosmology), we might even consider that, in a cosmological context, the idea of a 'bounded cosmic
time'  does  not  provide  a  correct  assessment  of  the  situation.  We  cannot  move  backwards  in  time  along  an
incomplete time-like geodesic below the electroweak phase transition around 10-11 since we loose a meaningful
notion of time associated with the parameter of the curve. We cannot resort anymore to the idea that we still have a
finite proper time even if t = 0 is not reached; it does not seem feasible in this situation to identify an improper
integral between 0+ and the present epoch with a physical proper time. In a cosmological context the argument for a
bounded cosmic time seems to breakdown. In fact it might be the case that in the context of present day cosmology
the question “did time have a beginning?” is not a well-posed one.
- there's no initial singular point.
- the geodesic of an observer moving backwards in time is incomplete – implying that it does not
reach an 'initial' point in space-time.
- the finite proper time of a backwardly moving observer does not imply a beginning of time. The
improper integral converges to a finite value as t → 0+ but the 'initial moment' is not reached. 
- the cosmic time of the universe is bounded, but there is no meaningful notion of 'beginning' in the
general relativistic model.
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